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SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND 
FINANCIAL STABILITY:  
REGULATORY CHALLENGES 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, secured transactions—by which I mean both traditional 
transactions directly secured by collateral, such as secured loans, and non-
traditional transactions indirectly secured by collateral, such as securitizations1—
are regulated to protect parties to the transactions and to make the transactions 
themselves more efficient.2 The global financial crisis of 2008 to 2009 (the 
“financial crisis”) has starkly revealed the broader need for “macroprudential” 
regulation to protect the stability of the financial system.3 Although that broader 
need is usually associated with financial institutions, this article analyzes why, and 
how, secured transactions should also be regulated to protect financial stability. 
The analysis raises many issues of first impression, discussed below as future 
regulatory challenges. 
 
Copyright © 2018 by Steven L. Schwarcz. 
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
 *  Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law; Founding 
Director, Duke Global Financial Markets Center; Senior Fellow, the Centre for International 
Governance Innovation. E-mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu. I thank Giuliano G. Castellano and Charles 
W. Mooney, Jr. for valuable comments and Miata Eggerly for helpful research assistance. 
 1.  Such non-traditional transactions are discussed infra notes 89–104 and accompanying text. They 
include not only the common securitizations indirectly secured by collateral, such as mortgage-backed 
securities, but also asset-backed securitizations that do not technically involve collateral, such as trade-
receivable securitizations. 
 2.  Cf. JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT 12 (1988) 
(observing that “securitization can lead to a more efficient financial services industry and one that can 
better [protect consumers] by satisfy[ing] the regulatory objectives of safety and soundness”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Luis E. Jácome & Erlend W. Nier, Macroprudential Policy: Protecting the Whole, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/macropru.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
5W4U-S577]; Behzad Gohari & Karen E. Woody, The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can 
Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, 40 J. CORP. L. 403, 403–06 
(2015); Speech of Governor Daniel K. Tarullo, Macroprudential Regulation, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
tarullo20130920a.htm [https://perma.cc/4TAV-FCZ6]. 
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II 
ANALYSIS 
A. Regulating Moral Hazard in Secured Loan Origination 
The first challenge concerns regulating moral hazard in secured loan 
origination. Moral hazard refers to the tendency of persons who are protected 
from the negative consequences of their risky actions to take more risks.4 The 
origination and subsequent selling of secured loans (often referred to as the 
originate-to-distribute, or OTD, model of loan origination) is often alleged to be 
a major source of moral hazard that can jeopardize financial stability. 
According to this allegation, the OTD model enables loan originators to 
make risky loans with impunity. The loans are packaged into investment 
securities and sold to institutional investors, which thereby assume the risks. That 
assumption of risk can cause investor failure, which in turn can cause a financial 
collapse if systemically important investors fail. It is widely believed, for example, 
that moral hazard resulting from the OTD model caused lax mortgage-loan 
“underwriting”5 standards, which contributed in this way to the financial crisis 
when risky mortgage loans were packaged into mortgage-backed securities and 
sold to institutional investors.6 Some argue that the OTD model of auto-loan 
origination is currently causing lax underwriting standards for those loans, too.7 
How and to what extent should macroprudential regulation address the OTD 
model of secured loan origination, in order to reduce this moral hazard? The 
answer requires a balancing of that model’s costs and benefits. The alleged moral 
hazard costs, described above, must be weighed against the model’s benefits, 
which include the ability to multiply loan funding and thus to increase consumer 
credit and other credit availability.8 Public policy demands easily available credit 
for consumers. Increased mortgage-loan funding, for example, makes housing 
more widely available. Regulation should not therefore ban the OTD model; 
 
 4.  BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 1777 (Stephen Michael Sheppard ed., Desk Edition, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012).  
 5.  “Underwriting” means, in this context, the standards under which mortgage loans are made or 
originated. In the context of issuing securities to investors, the term has a different meaning—the process 
by which securities firms sell those securities to the investors. 
 6.  See, e.g., Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the Resulting 
Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 120–29 (2009) (finding that loose lending 
standards were a primary cause of the housing bubble); Martin Feldstein, How to Stop the Mortgage 
Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7 2008, at A15 (stating that “[i]rresponsible lending created new mortgages with 
[loan-to-value] ratios of nearly 100%”). 
 7.  Cf. Matt Scully, ‘Deep Subprime’ Auto Loans are Surging, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-28/-deep-subprime-becomes-norm-in-car-loan-
market-analysts-say [https://perma.cc/TRD4-5TGN] (suggesting that the securitization of auto loans is 
motivating the making of riskier auto loans). 
 8.  To understand how the OTD model works to multiply loan funding, consider a simplified 
example in which ABC mortgage-loan originator has $500,000 to lend. If it makes five loans of $100,000 
each, it will be out of funds to make new loans. But if it can sell those five loans, it can then use the sale 
proceeds to make new mortgage loans. And those new mortgage loans, in turn, can be sold, generating 
additional funding, and so forth.  
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rather, it should temper its excesses. 
The Dodd-Frank Act implicitly attempts to do that. Rather than prohibiting 
lenders from selling off the loans they originate, the Act tries to control moral 
hazard by requiring lenders to retain an unhedged portion—ordinarily at least 
5%—of the credit risk on the loans they sell.9 By compelling them to continue to 
have “skin in the game,” Congress believed that lenders would act more 
prudently when originating loans. 
That regulatory approach may not be sufficient or even necessary. Moral 
hazard has the potential to occur when parties exposed to a loss cannot monitor 
(and thereby control) the conduct of a party taking risks that can cause that loss.10 
As a result, the risk-taking party can externalize (thereby becoming protected 
against) that loss.11 Remedies thus require reducing asymmetries of information 
or at least ensuring that risk-taking parties share enough of the losses resulting 
from their actions to incentivize them to behave more responsibly vis-a-vis third 
parties. 
In the context of the OTD model, markets themselves have addressed these 
issues. First-hand experience—which is confirmed by market information12— 
shows sophisticated purchasers have generally, even before the financial crisis, 
required sellers of loans to retain skin in the game, or the equivalent. This not 
only helps to realign incentives between the parties but also provides the 
fundamental solution to the “lemons” problem of asymmetric information: Why 
would a party consider purchasing a used car, given that the seller may well know 
of problems of which the buyer will be unaware?13 In accord with this solution, 
investors in third-party originated loans either satisfy themselves that the loans 
are of acceptable quality or demand guarantees, which can include requiring the 
seller to retain skin in the game in a market-negotiated amount and manner.14 
 
 9.  § 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that risk retention for all but the highest quality loans that 
originators sell. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act § 941, 15 U.S.C. § 78o–
11 (2012). Originators and other sellers of Qualified Residential Mortgage (QRM) loans—a designation 
based on a borrower’s ability to repay the mortgage loan at origination, a verification of the borrower’s 
income, and certain other relevant considerations—are not subject to risk-retention requirement.  
 10.  In the economic literature, moral hazard is defined as a problem of “hidden actions”; see Bengt 
Hölmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, BELL J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979) (noting that moral hazard is 
“an asymmetry of information among individuals that results because individual actions cannot be 
observed and hence contracted upon”).  
 11.  Cf. supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing moral hazard as a condition that protects 
persons from the negative consequences of their risky actions, thus leading them to take more risks). 
 12.  See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
RISK RETENTION 41 (Oct. 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/securitization/ 
riskretention.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AXG-JP8Z] (“Over time, a series of mechanisms has developed to 
mitigate these incentive and information problems. All mechanisms share to a certain extent two 
features: They increase overall the odds that an investor is repaid, and they put at least one member of 
the securitization chain at risk of loss should the assets perform worse than expected. This latter feature 
is often referred to as ‘skin in the game.’”).  
 13.  Cf. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (discussing how parties reduce information asymmetry). 
 14.  Cf. Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage 
Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539, 1546 
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These observations cast doubt on the need for regulatory intervention to 
attempt to correct a market failure that the market has already addressed. Loan 
originators would be motivated to lower their lending standards only if they could 
sell the loans to third parties; sophisticated investors, however, will not buy 
poorly originated loans at face value.15 In principle, therefore, market forces 
should already compensate for the separation of loan origination and ownership 
that is inherent in the OTD model.16 
For these reasons, regulation that merely repeats the market demand that 
sellers retain skin in the game (or its equivalent) is unnecessary, adding little to 
reduce moral hazard in secured loan origination or to mitigate problems arising 
from the OTD model but potentially increasing costs.17 Designing appropriate 
regulation requires a deeper understanding of the market failure underlying 
secured loan origination and the OTD model. I believe that failure is not 
asymmetric information but mutual misinformation—that neither the originator 
(that is, the seller) of the loan nor the buyer fully understands the risks associated 
with the loan. 
Prior to the financial crisis, for example, both mortgage-loan originators and 
investors in mortgage-backed securities generally overvalued mortgage loans.18 
That reflected in part the irrational characteristic of asset-price bubbles: the 
unfounded belief that downside risk—in that case, the risk of home prices 
plummeting—will never be realized.19 If housing prices are certain to increase, 
even subprime mortgage loans will become overcollateralized over time. 
Sellers became so confident in the value of the mortgage loans that they 
sometimes retained the lowest priority “residual” interests in the mortgage-
backed securities, which incongruously may have fostered false investor 
confidence, contributing to the financial crisis.20 Investors became so confident in 
the value of the mortgage-backed securities that they engaged in feeding frenzies 
for more, creating demand for an increased supply of mortgage loans which itself 
 
(2015) (observing that “if some form of risk retention by a seller is optimal to align incentives, then 
market participants will contract for it”). 
 15.  Cf. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2057–62 (2007) (discussing how originators try to solve 
the lemons problem of persuading securitization sponsors to purchase risky loans). Securities disclosure 
also requires the investors to be informed of material risks.  
 16.  Compare Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
211, 257 (2009) (arguing that, in theory, separation of origination and ownership should not matter 
because ultimate owners should assess and value risk before buying their ownership positions) with The 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments, 
14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 447, 451–52 (2008) (indicating that in the financial crisis investors did not make 
their own informed credit analysis but, instead, over-relied on credit ratings because the securities were 
so complex). 
 17.  These may include reporting or other regulatory costs.  
 18.  See Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 14, at 1547. 
 19.  Id. at 1546 (“[O]veroptimism about future house prices in a bubble leads market participants to 
underweigh the probability of default and blunts the incentive benefits of risk retention.”). The most 
infamous example of a bubble may be the 17th century Dutch tulip-bulb bubble.  
 20.  Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 16, at 241–42. 
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may have weakened mortgage-loan origination standards.21 
In short, the market has addressed concern over moral hazard arising from 
the OTD model, making regulatory intervention that repeats market solutions 
unnecessary and potentially costly. Furthermore, the relevant market failure is 
mutual misinformation, not asymmetric information arising from the OTD 
model.22 Originators made mortgage-loans with the expectation of selling them 
because they believed the reduced loan-origination quality was sufficient; 
investors purchased mortgage-backed securities payable solely from those loans 
because they too believed the reduced quality was sufficient.23 The future 
regulatory challenge will be trying to solve this problem of mutual 
misinformation. This article later explains how market failures such as cognitive 
bias24 and complexity25 contributed to this problem, suggesting that the focus of 
future regulation should include trying to correct those failures. 
B. Regulating Collateralization Levels 
Collateralization refers to the relationship between a loan’s collateral value 
and the amount of the loan. Prudent secured lending requires 
overcollateralization: that the loan’s collateral value exceeds the amount of the 
loan by some ratio.26 The higher the ratio (other things being equal), the more 
likely the loan will be repaid. Undercollateralized loans, for which the amount of 
the loan exceeds its collateral value, are generally imprudent and much less likely 
to be paid in full.27 
Lenders that become idiosyncratically undercollateralized—for example, 
because of lender-specific collateral valuation errors or declines in value—are 
unlikely to affect financial stability. Financial stability is threatened, however, if 
lenders that are interconnected by their collateral28 generally believe they are, or 
inevitably will become, overcollateralized, whereas they actually become 
undercollateralized.29 The potential for this disconnect between belief and reality 
 
 21.  See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris, Origins of the Subprime Crisis, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 73, 84 (2011). 
 22.  Cf. Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 14, at 1547 (stating that the “most influential evidence 
purportedly showing that securitization led to lax screening has now been discredited”). 
 23.  Cf. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 12, at 41 (observing that during 
“the financial crisis, some of these [skin-in-the-game] mechanisms failed to properly align incentives or 
to protect investors. Specific mechanisms, while effective in principle, may have failed in practice because 
they were too weak”); id. at 43 (stating that the financial crisis “subjected all of these [skin-in-the-game] 
mechanisms to a severe test”). 
 24.  Cf. infra notes 30–33 and accompanying text (discussing cognitive bias as a cause of mutual 
misinformation). 
 25.  Cf. infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (discussing complexity as a cause of mutual 
misinformation). 
 26.  See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L. J. 
1177, 1188 (2012). 
 27.  This assumes, of course, that the lender believes that collateral is needed as a source of 
repayment. Unsecured loans are prudent if the lender concludes that collateral is unnecessary. 
 28.  Cf. Part D, infra (discussing collateral as a source of interconnectedness). 
 29.  Cf. Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 14, at 1546–47 (observing that prior to the financial crisis, 
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is inherent in human behavior. 
For example, cognitive biases can combine to create a tendency to define 
future events by the recent past.30 This tendency can obscure rare events of 
extreme impact, especially when the biases apply to a commercial activity that is 
seemingly routine, such as valuing collateral.31 The resulting disconnect helps to 
explain both the financial crisis and the Great Depression.32 It also helps to 
explain the mutual misinformation problem.33 
Prior to the Great Depression, many banks engaged in margin lending—
lending to enable borrowers to purchase shares of publicly traded stock—to risky 
(in other words, subprime) borrowers, who secured their loans by pledging the 
purchased stock as collateral. An extended bull market led many—not only 
borrowers but also lenders—to believe the stock market would continue to rise, 
thereby overcollateralizing the loans. In August 1929, however, a decline in stock 
prices caused some of these margin loans to become undercollateralized. Some 
banks that were heavily engaged in margin lending lost so much money on the 
loans that they became unable to pay their obligations to other banks and 
depositors, creating defaults “down the chain of banks and beyond.”34 
Similarly, prior to the financial crisis, banks and other mortgage lenders made 
loans to subprime borrowers who used the loan proceeds to purchase homes and 
then mortgaged their homes as collateral to the lenders. The lenders expected 
housing prices to continue rising, as had been the case for decades, which would 
thereby overcollateralize the loans.35 Investors in mortgage-backed securities 
supported by these loans had the same expectation.36 That expectation again 
reflects the tendency to define future events by the recent past.37 
 
 
originators and investors generally overvalued mortgage loans). 
 30.  See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations and Legal 
Efficacy, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073 (2018). 
 31.  Cf. Susanna Kim Ripken, Paternalism and Securities Regulation, 21 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 17 
(2015) (arguing that investors are taken by surprise and unprepared to react effectively to a rare event of 
extreme impact).  
 32.  The following discussion is based partly on Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating 
Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1356–57, 1359–60 
(2011). 
 33.  See supra notes 18–25 and accompanying text. 
 34.  George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16 CATO J. 17, 21 
(1996). 
 35.  Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1359–60. Cf. Barry Ritholtz, Case Shiller 100 Year Chart 
(2011 Update), BIG PICTURE (Apr. 13, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2011/04/case-
shiller-100-year-chart-2011-update [https://perma.cc/HLB6-A5XW] (observing that if housing prices had 
continued rising, the increasing collateral value would have protected the loans). 
 36.  Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1359–60. 
 37.  Cf. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, The Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. 
CORP. L. 265, 316 n.373 (2012) (quoting Alan Greenspan’s observation that “the data inputted into the 
risk management models generally covered only the past two decades, a period of euphoria,” whereas 
the data more appropriately should have reflected “historic periods of stress”). 
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In the fall of 2007, however, housing prices collapsed by over 35%,38 a fall 
greater than what occurred during the Great Depression.39 The collapse in 
housing prices caused many subprime mortgage loans to become 
undercollateralized, contributing to the defaults on⎯and to the downgrading 
of⎯those mortgage-backed securities, which characterize the financial crisis.40 
 The challenge for macroprudential regulation is that law cannot erase the 
cognitive biases that disconnect belief and reality. A crude way to try to overcome 
this disconnect is by requiring a minimum level of overcollateralization, perhaps 
stressing historical data. Professors Bubb and Krishnamurthy advocate that 
approach for home-mortgage lending.41 The Federal Reserve also used that 
approach to respond to the undercollateralization of margin loans that 
contributed to the Great Depression42 when it promulgated Regulations G, U, T, 
and X. 
These regulations require margin loans extended by banks, brokers, and 
dealers to maintain minimum levels of overcollateralization.43 Regulation U, for 
example, requires that margin lending by banks be secured by collateral worth at 
least twice as much as the loan amount—effectively 100% 
overcollateralization44—unless the lender independently verifies that the 
borrower itself is able to repay the loan.45 Such overcollateralization would allow 
the stock market to lose half of its value while still providing adequate collateral 
 
 38.  This 35% figure is based on the S&P Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index peak to 
trough, http://us.spindices.com/indices/real-estate/sp-case-shiller-20-city-composite-home-price-index 
[https://perma.cc/J29T-4AMK]; see also Al Yoon, Home Price Drops Exceed Great Depression: Zillow, 
Reuters, Jan. 11, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/11/us-usa-housing-prices-idUSTRE 
70961E20110111 [https://perma.cc/L9LB-LH5J]. 
 39.  In rating mortgage-backed securities, rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s 
conservatively—so they thought—assumed that housing prices might drop as much as 20%. Wall Street 
and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(statement of Susan Barnes, Managing Director, Standard & Poor’s Rating Services), 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/wall-street-and-the-financial-crisis-
the-role-of-credit-rating-agencies [https://perma.cc/EU4U-H8C2]. 
 40.  Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1360 (“When home prices began falling, some of these 
asset-backed securities began defaulting, requiring financial institutions heavily invested in these 
securities to write down their value, causing these institutions to appear, if not be, financially risky.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 41.  Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 14, at 1610. 
 42.  I have separately argued that the QRM designation, which exempts originators and other sellers 
of loans from risk-retention requirements (see supra note 9 and accompanying text), should non-
exclusively be satisfied by requiring a minimum level of overcollateralization. See Macroprudential 
Regulation of Mortgage Lending, 69 SMU L. REV. 595, 598 n.22 (2016). 
 43.  See Robert J. Gareis & Jerome W. Jakubik, The United States Securities Credit Regulations: How 
they Affect Foreign Lenders in Acquisitions of US Companies, 4 J. COMP. & CORP. & SECS. REG. 291 
(1982) (describing the purpose and implementation of securities credit regulations). 
 44.  12 C.F.R. § 221 (2015). Subject to a number of regulatory exceptions, a loan falls under 
Regulation U if it (1) is secured by “margin stock,” (2) is intended to finance the purchase of margin 
stock, and (3) does not otherwise qualify for an exemption. 
 45.  This reflects that unsecured loans are prudent if the lender concludes that collateral is 
unnecessary. See supra note 27. 
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value to repay the lender. Since the Great Depression, Regulation U has been 
instrumental in avoiding problems from subprime margin lending.46 
 In practice, however, regulation requiring a minimum level of 
overcollateralization can undermine consumer-oriented goals. It is doubtful, for 
example, that anything near 100% overcollateralization could politically—or 
should socially—be required for home-mortgage lending; the impact on 
homeownership would be much too regressive.47 Unlike borrowing to purchase 
shares of stock, borrowing to purchase a home is seen not only as a public good 
but also, given the high cost of housing, as a necessity.48 
 For home-mortgage lending, Bubb and Krishnamurthy suggest what they 
see as a practical regulatory compromise. They would require a minimum 
overcollateralization, such as 10%,49 arguing that many homeowners can afford 
to make a small downpayment.50 They see that level of overcollateralization as 
providing both microprudential and macroprudential protection—the former, 
helping to protect individual homeowners against a decline in housing prices, and 
the latter helping to prevent price bubbles.51 Nevertheless, the more than 35% 
decline of housing prices during the financial crisis52 raises questions whether 
requiring 10% overcollateralization would be anywhere near sufficient for 
macroprudential protection. It is also questionable whether the added benefits of 
reduced foreclosures resulting from a mere 10% overcollateralization 
requirement would outweigh the costs of reducing the access of low-income 
borrowers and borrowers of color to mortgage lending.53 
  
 
 46.  See, e.g., Gikas A. Hardouvelis, Margin Requirements, Volatility, and the Transitory Component 
of Stock Prices, 80 AMER. ECON. REV. 736, 745–54 (1990) (finding a statistically significant negative 
relationship between margin levels and stock market volatility and excess volatility in the post-
Depression period).  
 47.  Bubb and Krishnamurthy concede that there will be costs associated with requiring higher down 
payments, especially for borrowers with limited resources. However, they argue that the costs should be 
low for three reasons: (1) increased down payments would increase incentives to save, (2) interest rates 
would decrease due to lower incidence of default, making housing more affordable, and (3) fewer defaults 
would reduce home price volatility, thereby making housing more affordable throughout housing cycles. 
Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 14, at 1619–22. 
 48.  See, e.g., Nick Timiraos, Report: Half of All Homes Are Being Purchased With Cash, WALL ST. 
J. (Aug. 15, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2013/08/15/report-half-of-all-homes-are-being-
purchased-with-cash/ [https://perma.cc/3K5Q-4STK] (stating that before the financial crisis, over two-
thirds of all home purchases were financed).  
 49.  Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 14, at 1610. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 1614. 
 52.  See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 53.  Roberto G. Quercia, Lei Ding & Carolina Reid, Balancing Risk and Access: Underwriting 
Standards and Qualified Residential Mortgages, U. N.C. CTR. FOR COMMUNITY CAP. 1, 33 (2012), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/Underwriting-
Standards-for-Qualified-Residential-Mortgages.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT7T-HN6P] (finding that the 
added benefits of reduced foreclosures resulting from loan-to-value (LTV) requirements of 80 or 90% 
do not necessarily outweigh the costs of reducing the access of borrowers—especially low-income 
borrowers and borrowers of color—to mortgage lending). 
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Regulating collateralization levels would also need to address how collateral 
should be valued. Valuing collateral is always an art. Where the collateral itself 
is a traded financial asset—such as mortgage-backed securities that serve as the 
source of payment in securitization transactions,54 valuation faces an additional 
problem: Should the collateral be valued at a “market” price or at its intrinsic 
value? Because markets—especially markets in which the assets are privately 
traded—are imperfect, the market price of collateral may not always equal its 
intrinsic value.55 In those cases, regulators would have to decide which to use. 
C. Regulating Collateral as a Source of Interconnectedness 
Interconnectedness is one of the most critical factors in creating systemic 
risk.56 A localized shock is unlikely to destabilize the financial system. 
Interconnectedness, however, can cause a localized shock to become widespread, 
and thus much more destabilizing. Collateral can cause that 
interconnectedness—and indeed, as next explained, undercollateralization links 
this discussion of regulating collateral as a source of interconnectedness to the 
prior discussion57 of regulating collateralization levels. 
Prior to the financial crisis, for example, the widespread use of subprime 
home mortgages as collateral connected massive amounts of financial institution 
investments in debt securities. A nationwide fall in home prices caused the 
mortgage loans to become uncollateralized, in turn causing those debt securities 
to be downgraded or default and triggering the crisis.58 Similarly, prior to the 
Great Depression, the widespread use of margin stock as collateral connected 
massive amounts of bank lending. A fall in the stock market caused those loans 
to become uncollateralized, leading to loan defaults that contributed to the 
Depression.59 
Regulation itself can also exacerbate interconnectedness. Although it does 
not involve secured transactions per se, consider how otherwise appropriate 
regulation can cause an industry not normally associated with systemic risk—
insurance—to generate such risk. Insurers are the dominant institutional 
 
 54.  Cf. infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing securitization transactions). 
 55.  See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., [2008] EWHC (Ch.) 1594 (Eng.) (observing, at 
paragraph twenty-one of the opinion, that extreme illiquidity in the structured products markets reduced 
the market value of the (largely non-defaulted) collateral to significantly less than the present value of 
the collateral’s expected cash flows). 
 56.  See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CALIBRATING THE GSIB 
SURCHARGE 3 (July 20, 2015). Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the 
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 379–83 & 404–05 (2008) (observing that the 
financial crisis demonstrated that a concurrence of failures is likely when the causes of the failures are 
interconnected); Janet L. Yellen, Vice-Chair of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Speech at the Annual Meeting of the National Association for Business Economics (Oct. 11, 2010) 
(attributing the financial crisis to concurrences of interrelated failures). 
 57.  See supra Part B. 
 58.  See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.  
 59.  See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
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investors in corporate bonds.60 Regulation requiring insurers to hold mostly 
investment-grade securities can prompt the “forced selling” of bonds that are 
downgraded, potentially causing systemic consequences.61 There is “strong, 
newly emerging evidence” that insurers contributed to the financial crisis by 
engaging in fire sales of downgraded mortgage-backed securities.62 
What do these observations mean for regulating secured transactions to 
promote financial stability? They at least suggest that regulators should try to 
monitor investments that are, or could be, interconnected by their collateral.63 
Furthermore, any regulation of secured transactions should avoid imposing 
industry-wide incentives to sell collateral, which can prompt firesales. 
D. Regulating Access of Systemically Important Firms to Reorganization 
Financing 
Firms can grant so much collateral as to undermine their ability, if they 
become troubled, to successfully reorganize. If substantially all, or even a 
substantial part, of a troubled firm’s assets have already been encumbered by 
liens, for example, the firm may be unable to borrow new money in order to pay 
operating expenses while it tries to reorganize.64 Absent the ability to borrow, the 
firm may have little choice but to liquidate. 
This type of a “Faustian bargain” is common for troubled corporations.65 
However, this decision can cause widespread social and economic consequences 
for systemically important firms, whose liquidation might well trigger a broader 
systemic collapse.66 This is not yet recognized as a problem, in part because 
systemically important firms tend to be banks or other financial institutions, 
 
 60.  Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1569, 1602 (2014). 
 61.  See id. at 1602–03. 
 62.  Id. at 1604–05. Another article in this symposium issue explains why international banking 
regulation can exacerbate systemic risk by incentivizing banks to take more risky collateral. See Giuliano 
G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, 81 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2018, at 77–84.  
 63.  Part B of this article also explains why it is important to regulate the collateralization levels of 
these types of investments.  
 64.  Cf. 11 U.S.C. §§ 364, 361 (motivating lenders to advance debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing 
to a firm in bankruptcy by granting the lender a priority of repayment, but requiring existing secured 
lenders to be adequately protected which effectively requires they be secured by substitute collateral). 
 65.  Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 
DUKE L. J. 425 (1997) (examining the cost of granting collateral). 
 66.  In the United States, certain systemically important firms must file so-called living wills, which 
are resolution plans setting forth how they could liquidate with minimal systemic impact if they become 
financially troubled. See, e.g., Jennifer Meyerowitz et al., A Dodd-Frank Living Wills Primer: What you 
Need to Know Now, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 34 (Aug. 2012). Although this requirement is intended 
to protect financial stability without needing a bailout, it might not completely eliminate that need. In 
my many years as a workout and bankruptcy lawyer, I rarely saw a firm’s failure that accurately reflected, 
much less closely resembled, expectations about the firm when it was profitable. Furthermore, living wills 
do not prevent the concurrent failure of multiple otherwise-systemically important firms from collectively 
having a systemic impact. The financial crisis demonstrated that a concurrence of failures is likely when 
the causes of the failures are interconnected. 
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which currently do not pledge as much collateral as industrial firms.67 However, 
that practice may change.68 
Regulation could address this problem by limiting the right of systemically 
important firms to grant collateral. There is, however, a less paternalistic and 
more flexible approach. The inability to borrow new money turns on the current 
legal requirement that existing secured lenders be adequately protected before 
reorganization financiers can get a priority of repayment.69 Adequate protection 
effectively requires the secured lenders to obtain substitute unencumbered 
collateral.70 If all or substantially all of its assets are already encumbered, a firm 
will be unable to grant such substitute collateral.71 A change in law, however, 
could potentially limit that adequate-protection requirement—thereby enabling 
a troubled systemically important firm that has already encumbered its assets to 
give reorganization financiers priority repayment. That implicitly would limit the 
ability of systemically important firms to grant collateral, because secured lenders 
could not be certain of repayment should the firm later become troubled. It also 
would recognize that avoiding a systemic economic collapse should outweigh the 
harm of the reorganization-financier claims priming existing secured claims. 
In the United States, that change in law might raise novel constitutional 
questions—whether it violates the Fifth Amendment by depriving a person of 
“property, without due process of law” or by creating a “taking” of private 
property for public use.72 Arguably, that change in law should not violate due 
process if it creates a legal process to govern the circumstances under which a 
troubled systemically important firm could give reorganization financiers priority 
repayment.73 At the judicial hearing that is part of that process,74 the court could 
duly take into account competing public and private concerns.75 Arguably, too, 
 
 67.  Also, systemically important firms that are banks technically are not governed by the 
Bankruptcy Code itself. See 11 U.S.C. § 109.  
 68.  Cf. Harvey R. Miller, Keynote Address: Bankruptcy And Reorganization Through The Looking 
Glass Of 50 Years (1960 – 2010), American College of Bankruptcy, Induction of Fellows, United States 
Supreme Court 18–19 (Mar. 12, 2010) (on file with author) (observing that pledging all assets is becoming 
a new normal). 
 69.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 72.  Many thanks to Joseph Blocher and Ernest Young for helpful comments on this Fifth 
Amendment discussion. 
 73.  Cf. James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditor’s Rights in Reorganization: A Study of 
the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 1003–
05 (1983) (arguing that because the Constitution’s “bankruptcy clause confers on the federal government 
the authority to exercise control over the use of the debtor’s existing assets in order to enhance and 
preserve his earning power[,] an expansion of the scope of the substantive powers conferred by the 
bankruptcy clause” that effects this result may be permissible under the Fifth Amendment). Rogers also 
argues that the view that bankruptcy law may not impair the liquidation value of a secured creditor’s 
collateral without just compensation is “entirely unsound.” Id. at 978.  
 74.  Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 364(b) (requiring notice and a hearing for any priority given to reorganization 
financiers outside of the ordinary course of the debtor’s business). 
 75.  The court should consider, for example, the extent to which the reorganization financing is likely 
to enable the systemically important firm to reorganize, thereby not only avoiding a systemic economic 
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that change in law should not create a taking if the court concludes that the 
reorganization financing is likely to enable the systemically important firm to 
reorganize, thereby not only avoiding a systemic economic collapse but also 
protecting existing secured lenders by ultimately enabling their repayment.76 
More theoretically, that change in law should not violate the Fifth 
Amendment because collateral should not itself be considered property per se.77 
Collateral is merely a mechanism for advancing the priority of a creditor’s claim 
over the claims of unsecured creditors.78 Once a secured claim is paid, the secured 
creditor has no interest in the surplus collateral value.79 Nor does a secured 
creditor have a right to a collateral cushion beyond the level needed to assure its 
repayment.80 
A troubled systemically important firm can therefore, constitutionally, give 
reorganization financiers priority of repayment over unsecured creditors without 
providing adequate protection. Such a firm ought to be allowed to give that 
priority of repayment over secured creditors if necessary to obtain reorganization 
financing. 
E. Regulating Remedies against Collateral 
This regulatory challenge focuses on whether remedies against collateral 
should be influenced by macroprudential concerns. For example, should 
systemically important secured parties have greater remedies against collateral, 
in order to protect them, than other secured parties? Should systemically 
 
collapse but also protecting existing secured lenders by ultimately enabling their repayment.  
 76.  See supra note 75. Cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498–99 
(1987) (finding no “taking” under the Fifth Amendment where state regulation required that mining 
leaves at least 50% of underground coal in place; the Court reasoned that the regulation furthered the 
public purpose of preventing subsidence damage to surface structures and did not completely rule out 
profitable coal mining). Even if this article’s proposed change in law were to create a taking, the 
government could avoid violating the Fifth Amendment by paying “just compensation” to the existing 
secured lenders. It might also avoid violating the Fifth Amendment by making the change in law 
prospectively applicable, subordinating the rights of only future secured lenders. Cf. Eastern Enterprises 
v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 504, 532–33 (1998) (finding that legislation retroactively impairing pension rights 
violated the Fifth Amendment). 
 77.  The claim that collateral should not itself be considered property per se may be controversial. 
Professor Mooney comments that claim is “wrong as a statement of law . . . . For example, in the 
bankruptcy context if a secured claim were not property then the provisions on adequate protection and 
relief from the automatic stay would on their face be inapplicable to a secured claim.” Comment on Essay 
Draft by Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Charles A. Heimbold, Jr. Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., 
(Sept. 22, 2017). I have even observed, in an analogous context, that secured claims are treated in federal 
civil forfeiture cases as if they create some type of property right. Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan Rothman, 
Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of Commercial Law?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 287 (1993). This claim, 
however, is normative, and the reality of what is does not control what ought to be. G.E. MOORE, 
PRINCIPIA ETHICA 66–69 (Thomas Baldwin ed., rev. ed. 1993) (1903).  
 78.  Cf. MARTIN J. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 166 (1987) (“When a creditor 
holding a secured claim is temporarily stayed from realizing on its collateral security, the stay is abridging 
only the contractual rights of the secured claimholder and is not a taking of property rights.”). 
 79.  U.C.C. § 9-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).  
 80.  Charles J. Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 103, 108 (2013). 
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important debtors have greater immunities against foreclosure than other 
debtors? These questions link this discussion to the prior discussion81 of whether 
regulation should protect systemically important firms by limiting their right to 
grant collateral. 
In the United States, and under analogous laws of other jurisdictions,82 the so-
called bankruptcy safe harbor for derivatives and other financial contracts gives 
counterparties to these contracts “virtually unlimited enforcement rights against 
the debtor” and the collateral,83 in contrast to the rights of other creditors. For 
example, derivatives counterparties can foreclose on the collateral 
notwithstanding the automatic stay under bankruptcy law.84 Also, derivatives 
counterparties need not “give back preferential collateral calls that other 
creditors must return.”85 The justification for the safe harbor is macroprudential: 
to protect financial stability.86 
Although there is significant uncertainty whether the derivatives safe harbor 
actually increases or reduces financial stability,87 it serves as a precedent for 
regulating remedies against collateral based on macroprudential concerns. This 
article defers a more complete analysis of this possible regulatory approach to 
another article in this symposium issue, which focuses on whether systemic 
importance should be an appropriate basis to vary collateral remedies.88 
F. Regulating Non-Traditional Secured Transactions 
To what extent, if any, should non-traditional secured transactions, including 
securitization and other forms of structured finance, be regulated to help control 
systemic risk? This challenge is important because securitization’s abuses 
arguably contributed to the financial crisis.89 
In a typical securitization transaction, a sponsor purchases a pool of loans or 
other rights to payment (“financial assets”) from firms, such as mortgage lenders, 
originating those assets (“originators”), and sells them to a special purpose entity 
(“SPE”, sometimes called a special purpose vehicle or SPV). The SPE then issues 
 
 81.  See supra Part D. 
 82.  Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk, 2015 
U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 701 (discussing how the safe harbor “serves as ‘an important precedent for the 
treatment of derivatives under insolvency law worldwide’”). 
 83.  Id. at 700.  
 84.  See id.  
 85.  Mark D. Roe, The Derivatives Markets Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 539, 547 (2011). In 2014, ISDA, the derivatives trade group, issued the Resolution Stay 
Protocol to eliminate certain of these rights for parties that opt into the Protocol regime. See International 
Swaps and Derivatives Assoc., ISDA 2014 Resolution Stay Protocol, https://www2.isda.org/functional-
areas/protocol-management/faq/20 [https://perma.cc/QXH6-N4JN] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017). 
 86.  Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral, supra note 82, at 700. 
 87.  Cf. id. at 705; Roe, supra note 85, at 565 (arguing that the safe harbor reduces financial stability). 
 88.  See Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Creditor Equality, Secured Transactions, and Systemic Risk: A 
Complex Trilemma, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2018, at 87. 
 89.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization, Structured Finance, and Covered Bonds, 39 J. CORP. L. 129, 
130 (2013). 
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securities to investors, which are repayable from payments on the financial assets. 
Securitization enables originators to multiply their available funding by selling 
off their loans for cash, from which they can make new loans. Otherwise, the 
lenders would have to carry the loans on their books and recoup the principal 
over many years.90 
Prior to the financial crisis, securitization had become “one of the dominant 
means of capital formation” in the United States and abroad.91 The levels of 
securitization dropped precipitously, however, with allegations that its abuses 
contributed to that crisis. These alleged abuses centered around certain highly 
leveraged securitization transactions, usually called “ABS CDO” transactions—
referring to a securitization of collateralized debt obligations.92 Repayment of the 
highly rated securities issued in these transactions was so “extremely sensitive to 
cash-flow variations” that, when “the cash-flow assumptions turned out to be 
wrong, many of these [securities] defaulted or were downgraded.”93 That, in turn, 
sparked a loss of confidence not only in securitization generally but also in the 
value of credit ratings and of all highly rated debt securities.94 
The primary regulatory challenge for securitization and other non-traditional 
secured transactions is their complexity.95 Complexity can make disclosure 
insufficient as a means of reducing the information asymmetry between issuers 
of, and investors in, the resulting collateralized securities. Complexity can also 
make it harder to understand, which increases the chance of panics and, like the 
Delphic Oracle, make people prone to see what they want to see.96 Furthermore, 
it can heighten the risk of “mutual misinformation.”97 
Prior to the financial crisis, for example, the risks associated with these types 
of transactions were fully disclosed.98 Nevertheless, investors did not entirely 
understand the disclosure, in part because deciphering a prospectus, hundreds of 
pages long and full of detailed technical and legal phraseology, can be 
burdensome even for the most sophisticated institutional managers, causing them 
 
 90.  See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1283, 1295–98 (2012). 
 91.  Investment Company Act, Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992). 
 92.  Schwarcz, supra note 90, at 1285.  
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Cf. Manuel A. Utset, Financial System Engineering, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 371 (2013) 
(identifying complexity as the core problem resulting in systemic market failures). 
 96.  Cf. Ricardo J. Caballero & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity, 68 J. FIN. 2549 
(2013) (arguing that complexity generates uncertainty, especially about counterparty exposure, which 
causes financial institutions to “retrench into a liquidity conservation mode” and possibly engage in fire 
sales of assets). 
 97.  See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 16, at 241–42 (observing 
that by retaining residual risk portions of certain complex securitization products they were selling prior 
to the financial crisis, securities underwriters may actually have fostered false investor confidence, 
contributing to the crisis). 
 98.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 
1109, 1110. 
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to over-rely on heuristics such as credit ratings and the collective action failure 
that other investors are likewise investing in those types of securities.99 
How should regulation address this problem of complexity? One approach 
might be to try to simplify non-traditional secured transactions without unduly 
sacrificing their economic value. The European Union is currently pursuing this 
approach as part of its proposed regulations to create a framework for “simple, 
transparent, and standardized” (“STS”) securitization.100 The EU expects that 
STS securitization will create an important additional source of funding for its 
economy.101 
Government-imposed standardization can unduly inhibit financial 
innovation.102 The STS approach is more nuanced, though; it does not require 
standardization, it merely rewards standardized simplicity—and it appears to 
contemplate a significant degree of market flexibility in achieving that 
simplicity.103 Furthermore, STS securitizations encompass the basic types of 
securitization transactions that were originated in the 1980s and became 
economically significant during the 1990s, when the SEC touted their 
importance.104 
Ultimately, however, the STS proposal does not—and to protect efficiency, it 
probably should not—prohibit financial experimentation and innovation. For 
that reason, regulation may only be a partial solution to the problem of 
complexity in non-traditional secured transactions. 
G. Recognizing De Facto Collateral Rights 
An indirect—but nonetheless real—threat to financial stability is the 
shrinking middle class and the widening gap between the rich and the poor.105 
The World Economic Forum has identified wealth inequality as the biggest risk 
 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See generally Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (EC) No. 
472/2015 of 30 Sep. 2015, 2015/0226 (COD). In 2017, the European Commission conducted a mid-term 
review of the 2015 regulations, evaluating the progress that had been made and enumerating new 
“priority objectives.” See generally European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions on the Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan, SWD (2017) 225 final 
(June 8, 2017). 
 101.  See EU Regulation 575/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 16 (stating that the primary purpose is ensuring 
the operation of vital services to the real economy while limiting the risk of moral hazard). 
 102.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. 
L. REV. 815, 820 (observing that “the overall impact of standardization is unclear because standardization 
can stifle innovation and interfere with the ability of parties to achieve the efficiencies that arise when 
firms craft financial products tailored to the particular needs and risk preferences of investors”). 
 103.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, A Global Perspective on Securitised Debt, in CAPITAL MARKETS 
UNION IN EUROPE (Guido Ferrarini, Emilios Avgouleas & Danny Busch eds.) (forthcoming 2018).  
 104.  See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 105.  See, e.g., How Inequality Affects Growth, ECONOMIST (June 15, 2015), https:// 
www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/06/economist-explains-11 [https://perma.cc/5QN3-
ED8W] (discussing “recent work suggest[ing] that inequality [in wealth] could lead to economic or 
financial instability”). 
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to the global community.106 The noted economist Hernando De Soto has 
explained how that inequality ties directly into secured transactions.107 
He argues that the poor hold their resources in defective form, living in 
houses built on land that, de facto, is theirs but not legally recorded as their 
property.108 As a result, they cannot use their houses as collateral to borrow.109 
Mortgage lending, he observes, is the primary source of capital used to start small 
businesses.110 Economically disadvantaged people may also hold other assets that 
cannot currently be used as collateral due to legal constraints. 
This poses an important regulatory challenge: Should secured transactions 
law recognize de facto rights to enable the poor to use their homes and other 
commonly held assets as collateral? In thinking about this challenge, it may be 
useful to compare the Uniform Commercial Code’s innovative disentanglement 
of commercial and property law.111 For example, U.C.C. § 9-202 provides that, 
with very limited exceptions, “the provisions of this Article [9] with regard to 
rights and obligations apply whether title to collateral is in the secured party or 
the debtor.” Secured transactions law thus provides that the “retention or 
reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to 
the buyer . . . is limited in effect to a reservation of a ‘security interest.’”112 U.C.C. 
§ 2-401 similarly provides, again with very limited exceptions, that each 
“provision of this Article [2] with regard to the rights, obligations, and remedies 
of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of 
title to the goods . . . .” U.C.C. § 2-509 even allocates the risk of losing goods in 
shipment to the party who “control[s] the goods and can be expected to insure 
his interest in them,”113 whether or not that party owns the goods at the time of 
their loss. 
These provisions recognize that property law does not necessarily reflect 
commercial realities; instead, they articulate commercial law to reflect 
commercial realities rather than the “arbitrary shifting” of rights based on 
property.114 Similarly innovating secured transactions law to enable the holders 
 
 106.  WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 2014 13–14 (2014). 
 107.  See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6 (2000). 
 108.  Id. at 5–6. 
 109.  Id. at 6. 
 110.  Id.; cf. Chris Arsenault, Property Rights for World’s Poor Could Unlock Trillions in “Dead 
Capital”, REUTERS BUS. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-landrights-
desoto/property-rights-for-worlds-poor-could-unlock-trillions-in-dead-capital-economist-
idUSKCN10C1C1 [https://perma.cc/D4X7-CM4P] (arguing that without the ability to borrow by using 
their homes as collateral, the poor are “unable to leverage their resources to create wealth, and their 
assets become ‘dead capital’ which cannot be used to generate income or growth”).  
 111.  Although (for largely path-dependent reasons, including the lobbying power of the real-estate 
Bar) the U.C.C. does not apply to security interests in real estate, its innovative principles—such as this 
disentanglement of commercial and property law—merit consideration. 
 112.  U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (defining a “security 
interest”). 
 113.  U.C.C. § 2-509 cmt. n.3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 114.  Cf. U.C.C. § 2-509 cmt. n.1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (observing that the 
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of de facto rights to use their homes and other assets as collateral to borrow could 
help to unlock “the entrepreneurial potential of billions of people.”115 
Consider also a related challenge for secured transactions law in the twenty-
first century (this symposium’s theme) that goes beyond financial stability (this 
article’s focus).116 The U.C.C.’s innovative disentanglement of commercial and 
property law suggests other possible legal improvements. For example, non-
U.C.C.-governed secured transactions are sometimes uneasily bound by 
property-law rules to create security interests, such as jurisdictions that still 
depend on retention of ownership arrangements, including conditional sale 
agreements.117 In contrast, the more unitary concept of security interests, 
reflected in the U.C.C., brings “all secured transactions on personal property and 
fixtures under the same roof if a transaction ‘in substance secures payment and 
performance of an obligation . . . regardless of its form or who has title to the 
collateral.’”118 Scholars may wish to think through the consequences of these 
differing approaches, including the potential for further cross-border 
harmonization of secured transactions law. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
Although secured transactions traditionally are regulated to protect 
transacting parties and to make the transactions themselves more efficient, the 
financial crisis has revealed that regulation should also protect the stability of the 
financial system. This raises numerous future challenges.119 
 
 
“underlying theory” is to avoid “an arbitrary shifting of the risk with the ‘property’ in the goods”). The 
U.C.C. itself does not yet clearly embrace the recognition of de facto rights as a basis to grant a security 
interest. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2) & cmt. n.6 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (requiring 
the debtor to have “rights in the collateral” as a condition of granting a security interest therein, but not 
discussing whether de facto rights might suffice).  
 115.  Arsenault, supra note 110. 
 116.  But cf. Michael Bridge & Jo Braithwaite, Private Law and Financial Crises, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 
361 (Oct. 2013) (discussing how conflating contract and property in derivatives transactions in insolvency 
can jeopardize financial stability). 
 117.  Acquisition financing in many European jurisdictions is often regulated by property-law rules. 
See Giuliano G. Castellano, Reforming Non-Possessory Secured Transactions Laws: A New Strategy?, 78 
MOD. L. REV. 611, 615 (2015); cf. Tibor Tajti, Could Continental Europe Adopt a Uniform Commercial 
Code Article 9-Type Secured Transactions System? The Effects of the Differing Legal Platforms, 35 
ADELAIDE L. REV. 149, 161 (2014) (discussing acquisition finance that relies on retention of ownership). 
 118.  Id. at 150; cf. supra note 112 and accompanying text (observing that the U.C.C. provides that the 
retention of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding delivery to the buyer is limited to a security 
interest).  
 119.  The regulation of secured transactions can raise other concerns that implicate financial stability, 
but they are much more diffuse. For example, because secured transactions facilitate access to credit, 
which is a critical element of a healthy economy, regulation that overly restricts secured transactions can 
weaken financial stability by causing underinvestment in credit. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Financial 
Crisis and Credit Unavailability: Cause or Effect?, 72 BUS. LAW. 409, 409–10 (2017) (arguing that a loss 
of credit availability appears to have caused the financial crisis more than the reverse, and that regulators 
should try to identify and correct system-wide flaws in making credit available). 
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In our increasingly complex financial system, for example, regulation to 
control moral hazard in the originate-to-distribute model of secured loan 
origination faces the challenge that the relevant market failure is less likely to be 
asymmetric information than mutual misinformation—neither the originator of 
the loans nor the buyer may fully understand the risks. Non-traditional secured 
transactions, including securitization and other forms of structured finance, 
exacerbate the challenges of complexity and the limits of disclosure. 
The regulation of collateralization levels and interconnectedness faces 
fundamentally different challenges than those underlying the (technically) 
analogous post-Depression regulation of “margin” lending to acquire publicly 
traded stock. The Federal Reserve’s Regulation U then required that stock 
pledged as collateral be worth at least twice the loan amount. Requiring 
overcollateralization of home-mortgage lending, however, could be highly 
regressive. 
The potential for the widening gap between the rich and the poor to 
undermine stability also raises the challenge of whether to recognize de facto 
rights, in order to enable the poor to use their homes and other commonly held 
assets as collateral to raise capital. This challenge is itself partly informed by the 
U.C.C.’s innovative disentanglement of commercial and property law, which 
articulates the former to reflect commercial realities rather than the arbitrary 
shifting of rights based on property. Innovating secured transactions law to 
recognize those de facto rights could help to unlock a worldwide entrepreneurial 
potential. 
 
 
